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DISEASE-PREVENTION CLAIMS AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT:
WHO WILL PROTECT US FROM OUR PROTECTORS?1
As to the particular consumer's interest in the free ow of commercial informa-
tion, that interest may be as keen, if not keener by far, than his interest in the
day's most urgent political debate.2
I. Introduction
The area of disease-prevention claims (health claims) for food poses a broad
spectrum of d-ilemmas that often arise in the food and drug law area and
in other regulatory situations. These recurring questions include: How does
an agency balance the public's right to information with the agency's desire
to prevent consumer deception? Given an agency's broad mandate to protect
public health, what type of consumer should it aim to protect with its limited
resources? What should an agency do in the face of uncertainty? To what
extent, and under what conditions, is informed choice desirable? How much of
an agency's role is or should be educational? How should an agency balance
consumers' need for information with the problem of information overload?
This paper will attempt to address these and other issues in the context of
the arguments over the First Amendment constitutionaljty of FDA's recently
revised treatment of health
1
Who Will Protect Us From Our Protectors?, Obi. News., May
1962, at 20.
2 Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,
425 U.S. 748 (1976).
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claims for food. Ultimately, this paper concludes that the
FDA's approach is not only open to attack on First Amendment grounds,
but also misconceived from an overarching policy perspective. This paper will
ultimately advance an alternative approach which, although not without its own
problems, would likely survive scrutiny on First Amendment grounds and also
address the major policy questions set forth above.
II. Statutory and Regulatory Background
A. The 1990 Nutrition LabelinQ and Education Act
In 1990, Congress enacted the Nutrition Labeling and
4
Education Act, in order to help U.S. consumers maintain healthy dietary
practices and to protect these consumers from unfounded
health claims.5 Congress characterized the need for regulation as compelling
in a House Report of June, 13, 1990. Some proponents of the statute emphasized
that it was intended to alleviate the problems of classifying foods as drugs
whenever health claims are made about them and that it was intended to be
a more exible standard than the standards for new drugs.6 One proponent of
the statute admitted that it was intended to remedy
3
The highly contentious debate over dietary supplements is beyond the scope
of this paper, as is an in|depth analysis of the FTC's approach to these issues
in the advertising context. Rather, the scope of this paper is limited to the
FDA's regulation of conventional food labels.
104 Stat. 2353 (Nov. 8, 1990).
58 Fed. Reg. 2478|01.
6
See Cong. Rec. H5844 (statement of Congressman Waxman); 58 Fed. Reg.
2478-01.
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the fact that [n]either Federal regulation nor industry eorts have kept pace
with scientic knowledge about diet and nutrition. '
The Act adds a new section governing health claims to the
8
federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act. A food bearing a health claim must
meet the requirements of this new section (403(r)) and
the regulatory requirements of the FDA in order to be excluded from the
statutory denition of a drug and all of the regulatory requirements accompa-
nying new drug approval.
It is important to note at the outset that much of the contention in this area
surrounds the proper scope of x 403, which states that [a] food shall be deemed
to be misbranded (a) If (1) its labeling is false or misleading in any particular
.... The underlying question in much of the debate is the proper scope of the
term misleading, since this denition will determine the permissible scope of the
FDA's regulations.
B. FDA Regulations
1. Pre-1990 Treatment of Health Claims. { The FDA's regulation of health
claims for food has proceeded in stages.9 Since 1938, seeing numerous prod-
ucts marketed with unfounded
14.. (statement of Congressman Madigan).
See FD&C Act x 403(r).
See generally Peter Barton Hutt, Government Regulation of Health Claims in Food Labeling and Advertising,
41 Food Drug Cosm. L.J. 3 (1986)
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claims that they would cure various diseases, 10 the FDA has made it an
enforcement priority to prevent false or misleading nutrition claims in food la-
beling. A main aspect of this strategy has been to classify products for which
health claims are made as new drugs that be approved and meet the other statu-
tory requirements for drugs. This approach, however, was not entirely eective,
because it only worked if the manufacturer made explicit health claims.
Although the food-drug (and also the food-dietary food) distinction was
all-important until very recently, there has been an attempt with the recent
statutory amendments to make this distinction less determinative of the level of
regulation of a given product. In the face of constantly increasing evidence of
the link between proper diet and decreased risk of disease, the FDA must now
reconsider its traditional skepticism of all health claims for food.
2. Post-1990 FDA Policy: The Distinction Between Dietary Guidelines and Health Claims.
{ (a) Introduction. { In an attempt to balance its educative with its protec-
tive function, and in order to comply with the 1990 Act, the FDA has set forth
a distinction between dietary guidelines, which are to be
10 For a particularly amusing example, see the advertisement for Grant's
Hygienic Crackers in Hutt, supra note 9, at 6.
See, e.g., Surgeon General' s Report on Nutrition and
Health, DHHS (PHS) Pub. No. 88-50210 (1988) (discussing the
relationship of diet to health and disease); National Academy of
Sciences, Diet and Health: Implications for Reducing Chronic
Disease Risk (1989) (same).
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encouraged, and health claims, which are still forbidden except
12
when expressly authorized by the FDA. This Part will examine the FDA's
attempt to distinguish the two concepts, and whether
this attempt has been successful.
The regulations implementing the 1990 Act dene a health claim on a label
to include any claim that
expressly or by implication, including third party references, written statem~nts
(e.g., a brand name including a term such as heart), symbols (e.g., a heart sym-
bol), or vignettes, characterizes the relationship of any substance to a disease
or health related condition.
An example of a health claim is X helps reduce the risk of heart disease.
Implied health claims are subject to the same rules as explicit health claims, in
order to alleviate the prior problem of what to do when the manufacturer does
not make explicit health claims. FDA denes implied health claims as:
those statements, symbols, vignettes, or other forms of communication that
a manufacturer intends, or that would be reasonably understood in the context
in which they are presented, to assert a relationship between the presence or
level of a substance in the food and a disease or health-related condition.14
Whether implicit or explicit, FDA identies two elements of a health claim:
rst, there must be reference to a substance, dened as a specic food or compo-
nent of food; and second, there must be reference to a disease or health|related
12 x 101.14(e) (1), (e)(2).
13 21 C.F.R. x 101.14(a) (1).
14 58 Fed. Reg. 2478|01.
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condition, dened as damage to an organ, part, structure, or system of the body
such that it does not function properly ... or a state of health leading to such
dysfunctioning .... ,,15
FDA identies certain claims as exempt from the denition of health claim.
One group of claims that is allowed is identied as dietary guidance, dened
as claims that do not contain both basic elements of a health claim and are
therefore not 'health claims.'16 An example would be a claim that provide[s]
guidance about a general food choice or about how to achieve a healthy lifestyle.
FDA elaborates in another regulation that claims about the nutritive value of
food, dened as those claims relating to a value in sustaining human existence
by such processes as promoting growth, replacing loss of essential nutrients, or
providing energy, are not considered health claims.17
(b~ The Fuzziness of the Distinction. { For the most part, the era of the
food/drug or food/dietary food distinction as the key to determining a product's
level of regulation is behind us, given the 1990 amendments. Yet FDA makes
ne distinctions between health claims, both explicit and implicit, which are
still forbidden for the most part, and nutritional guidelines,
15 21 C.F.R. xx l0l.14(a)(2), (6).
16 58 Fed. Req. 2478|01.
17 21 C.F.R. x l0l.14(a)(3). Claims relating to diseases that are related to
deciencies in essential nutrients are also exempted from the denition of health
claim. See 21 C.F.R. x101.14 (a) (6).
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which are appropriate and even encouraged. But what assumptions are
reected in the health claim/health guidance distinction, and is it an improve-
ment? The attempt to distinguish the two is inevitably confusing || perhaps
even more than the food/drug or food/dietary food distinctions. The FDA has
conceded as much:
[Ulse of the term dietary guidance to describe claims that do not constitute
health claims is ... confusing because health claims themselves provide a form
of dietary guidance. In addition to health claims and dietary guidance, there is
a broader class of claims that encompasses all other truthful information about
diet and health as well as drug claims.18
An example may serve to illustrate the dilemma faced by manufacturers in
making the distinction. Suppose that a manufacturer wishes to include on his
label certain information contained in an AMA report that is favorable toward
the main ingredient of its product. The FDA has stated that:
[P]ublicly available dietary information provided to consumers by Federal or
private programs and used in food labeling by manufacturers may be either di-
etary guidance or a health claim depending upon the content of the information
and the context in which it is presented in the labeling.
Faced with such nebulous distinctions, it is virtually impossible for a manu-
facturer to tell whether its particular claim will be approved. Yet although these
distinctions are tenuous, they are outcome-determinative under the new regu-
lations, and at stake is whether or not a manufacturer can make the statement
at all.
58 Fed. Reg. 2478|01.
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III. First Amendment Complications
The FDA's policies toward health claims are especially troublesome when First
Amendment considerations are added to the analysis. The FDA's approach is
vulnerable to First Amendment attacks on many dierent fronts. After a brief
explanation of commercial speech doctrine, this Part will canvass the various
free speech implications of FDA's policies in this area.
A. Virginia Pharmacy and the Emergence of Commercial Speech
Until 1976, commercial speech was an unprotected speech
19
category, like libel and obscenity. However, the Supreme Court
abandoned this approach in Virginia Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia
20
Consumer Council, when it held that commercial speech that is not mislead-
ing (or proposing an illegal transaction) is entitled
to First Amendment protection, though not as extensive as speech nearer
the core of First Amendment values.21
The Virginia Pharmacy Court had two primary rationales for protecting
commercial speech. First, society has a strong interest in the free ow of com-
mercial information; and second, the First Amendment prohibits a state from
deciding that consumers would be best protected by ignorance (in that case,
19 See Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
20 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
21 Id.
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ignorance of prescription drug prices) 22 Thus, Virginia
Pharmacy seems to represent a shift in First Amendment emphasis from the
traditional right to disseminate information to the right to receive information,
though this contention is still controversial.
Qualications present in the Virginia Pharmacy opinion itself will prove to
be pivotal in the health claim area. First, the Court acknowledged that false or
misleading advertising can be prohibited; second, the Court hinted that broader
regulation of the time, place, and manner of commercial speech might be pos-
sible; and third, the Court stated that a strong presumption against prior re-
straints might not apply to commercial speech.
B. The Status of Health Claims { Commercial or Noncommercial?
Although labeling has been characterized as commercial speech by some
courts, no court has directly addressed the speech implications of the regulation
of scientic claims on labels. Thus, one of the questions that must be resolved
in order to evaluate the First Amendment soundness of the FDA's approach is:
where does scientic speech end and commercial speech begin? Some com-
mentators argue that health claims fall outside of
the commercial speech realm because they convey scientic
22 See also Linmark Assocs., Inc., v. Willingboro, 431 U.S.
85 (1977) (holding that a town's prohibition of For Sale and Sold signs
violated the First Amendment because it was an attempt to prevent white ight
by keeping the public in ignorance).
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23
information. Under this reasoning, health claims should
receive full First Amendment protection. Thus, the traditional First Amend-
ment analysis would be used: FDA's regulations would be constitutional only if
they furthered an important governmental interest unrelated to the suppression
of free expression and if the regulations were no more restrictive than neces-
sary. Under such an analysis, even though the prevention of consumer fraud is
certainly an important governmental interest, FDA's polices would likely fail as
insuciently narrow to accomplish that objective.24
Another aspect of health claims that lends strength to argument that they
are noncommercial in nature is the express Congressional and administrative
policy of educating the public in order to promote healthier lifestyle choices.
The most commonly used denition of commercial speech is speech that does no
more than propose a commercial transaction.25 Yet given the educative purposes
of such claims, they appear to do much more than that.
Finally, the Court has said that it is inappropriate to lower the level of First
Amendment protection based solely on the
23 See Martin H. Redish, Product Health Claims and the First
Amendment: Scientic Expression and the Twilight Zone of Commercial Speech,
43 Vand. L. Rev. 1433 (1990).
24 See id.
25 See Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 562.
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presence of a prot motive.26 The argument would be that punishing a man-
ufacturer for saying something that could be said in JANA is improper because
it eectively exclude[s] one sector
27
of society from participating in the public debate. To
overcome these arguments, the FDA would have to argue that speech linking
a product to a current public debate can still be
28
commercial speech. Nevertheless, if we say that commercial
speech is anything that is intended to enrich the company, then we are
perched precariously on an intent standard, which the
29
Court has forbidden. Prot motive has never been a useful way
to classify speech { one need only think of recording stars and lm producers
to see the pitfalls of this approach.
There are also those who argue that the commercial/noncommercial speech
distinction itself makes little sense. These theorists argue that such a distinc-
tion is not in the Constitution, and that the common sense dierences identied
in Virginia Pharmacy { that commercial speech is more easily veriable than
noncommercial speech, and that commercial speech is more durable than non-
commercial speech simply because it is
26 See. e.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964)
27 Alex Kozinski & Stuart Banner, Who's Afraid of Commercial Speech?,
76 Va. L. Rev. 627, 642 (1990).
28 See Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60
(1983) (holding that drug company mailings containing discussions of impor-
tant public issues (e.g. venereal diseases and family planning) were nevertheless
commercial speech).
29 See Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 761 | 65.
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engaged in for prot || are not necessarily accurate and in any
case might not lead to the conclusion that commercial speech
30
should get less protection than other speech. Professor Tribe
notes that, when the government tries to suppress information based on the
possibility that the communicative impact of the message will cause harm, the
regulation must survive strict
31
scrutiny; on this view, as discussed above, the FDA regulations
would almost invariably be struck down.
Even then-Justice Rehnquist's hostility toward commercial speech, as demon-
strated in his dissent in Virginia Pharmacy, is helpful in attempting to classify
health claims as noncommercial as opposed to commercial speech. Justice Rehn-
quist argued that the First Amendment was designed to protect discussion of
political, social and other public issues, rather than the decision of a particular
individual as to whether to purchase one or another kind of shampoo. Nutrition
and health are certainly social and public issues, and they are much less trivial
than a choice of shampoos.
C. Health Claims as Commercial Speech
Because the Court stated in Virginia Pharmacy that time,
place, and manner restrictions (TPM restrictions) can be somewhat freer when
necessary to prevent commercial speech from
30 See Kozinski, supra note 27.
See Laurence Tribe, American Constitutional Law (2d ed. 1988) (labeling
such cases track 1 cases).
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being misleading, FDA has a strong argument that, if health claims are
commercial speech, its regulations are proper. Nevertheless, the FDA's treat-
ment of health claims is problematic even under a liberal interpretation of the
commercial speech doctrine.
The Virginia Pharmacy Court stated that TPM restrictions are permissible
only if they are justied without reference to the content of the regulated speech,
... they serve a signicant governmental interest, and ... in so doing they leave
open ample alternative channels for communication of information.32 In that
case, because advertisements of prescription drug prices were prohibited, the
Court held that the proper bounds of TPM restrictions were plainly exceeded,
because the statute single[d] out speech of a particular content and [sought] to
prevent its dissemination.33 Along those lines, FDA's regulations are vulnerable,
because they attempt to single out only specic kinds of claims about products.
FDA's policies are also open to criticism as invalid TPM restrictions when
one focuses on the actual purposes of the regulations, which is one factor of
the analysis. Even without these regulations, FDA had the authority to forbid
false or misleading claims on labels, and it also has the duty to prevent harmful
products. A problem arises, however, when the goal of
32 See Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. 748.
Id.
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preventing deception leads FDA to forbid truthful, accurate information. It
is an open question whether the harms the FDA is trying to prevent, primarily
misinformation about nutrition and waste of money, are sucient to justify such
broad regulations.
FDA's approach is even vulnerable under the four|part Central Hudson
test,34 which seems to seems to suggest a type of intermediate scrutiny for com-
mercial speech. Under the Central Hudson test, a regulation of commercial
speech is allowed if: (1) the speech is not protected at all (i.e. it's misleading or
concerning an unlawful activity); (2) the governmental interest is substantial;
(3) the regulation directly advances the governmental interest; and (4) the reg-
ulation is not more extensive than is necessary to accomplish the governmental
interest; in other words, there is not a less restrictive alternative (LRA). Even
if FDA can persuasively argue that all or a majority of health claims are in-
herently misleading, and even though the government interest in prevention of
consumer fraud is substantial, it is still possible to argue persuasively that the
regulation is more extensive than necessary and does not directly advance the
interest in prevention of consumer fraud.
Although speech that has only the potential to mislead can be
35
regulated, when information can be presented either in a
Central Hudson Gas v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980) (involving
a ban on promotional advertising by utilities).
~ $~..g. Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1 (1979) (upholding a
Texas ban on the use of trade names by optometrists, on the ground that there
was a signicant possibility that
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misleading or a nonmisleading way a statute must attempt to regulate only the
misleading format.36 Thus, it is likely that FDA could be required to use the
methods it uses in other situations to prevent consumer misconceptions || for
example, regulation of the type size or location of health claims on the package.
Some might argue for an even higher level of scrutiny than that of the
Central Hudson majority, especially in the case of health claims. For example,
in his Central Hudson concurrence, Justice Blackmun argued that, although in-
termediate scrutiny is ne when speech is potentially misleading or coercive, it
gives too little protection against content-based regulation. Justice Blackmun
dened a regulation as content|based if it is a covert attempt by the state to
manipulate the choices of its citizens
by depriving the public of the information needed to make a free choice.
Furthermore, some Justices have expressed the view that strict scrutiny should
apply whenever the government suppresses commercial speech and its purpose is
to deprive consumers of accurate information concerning lawful activity.37 Under
this reasoning, FDA's attempt to protect consumers from making mistakes in
the face of health claims would be struck
trade names will be used to mislead the public). 36 See In re R.M.J.
See Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico,
478 U.S. 328 (1986) (Brennan, J., joined by Marshall, J., and Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
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down.
In sum, because content|based regulations are generally frowned upon, FDA's ne distinctions
between claims and guidance are quite vulnerable. The FDA can certainly proscribe false and
misleading statements in labeling. But when it regulates products dierently based on the content
of the claims made about them, many would argue that it oversteps the bounds of its mandate of
protecting health and safety and enters the realm of impermissible content|based regulation.
IV. A Less Restrictive Alternative:
FDA Non-Endorsement of Health Claims Pending Approval
A. Introduction
Because the underlying tenet of the First Amendment is to counter speech with speech,38 this
Part analyzes ways that FDA could avoid the next-to-impossible attempt to distinguish between
guidance and claims, and in the process decrease the possibility of consumer misconceptions while
at the same time allowing truthful information to reach the public.
B. A Practical Alternative
There is a less restrictive alternative to a nearly complete ban on health claims: rather than broad-
ening its own power and discretion at the expense of personal choice, FDA could require that health
claims include a statement that they have not been endorsed by the FDA, and any other statement
that it feels is
38 See Kozinski, supra note 27, at 648.
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necessary in order to prevent certain common misconceptions. The warning
might be along the following lines:
NOTE: THE FDA DOES NOT ENDORSE THE HEALTH
CLAIMS MADE BY THIS
PRODUCT. INDIVIDUAL HEALTH NEEDS VARY ACCORD-
ING TO AGE, BODY
SIZE, AND OTHER FACTORS. PLEASE SEE YOUR DOCTOR
BEFORE RELYING
ON HEALTH CLAIMS ABOUT ANY PARTICULAR PROD-
UCT.
Such a warning could be coupled with regulations that would provide only
that the health claim must accurately express, in simple terms, the amount of medical data backing the particular claim.
In other words, if a manufacturer wanted to make a claim based on only one
study, it could do so if it stated that fact explicitly.
C. The Advantages of This AP~roach
This approach recognizes the value of informed choice,39 the utility of warnings
as demonstrated in areas in which there is even greater danger of harm to the
consumer,40 and the desirability of individual medical judgment in the areas of
As one journalist put it, [t]rusting David Kessler to decide what health claims
you may hear is about as sensible as trusting Pat Robertson to decide what
movies you may see. Stephen Chapman, FDA's War Against Health Claims Also Attacks Free Speech,
Chicago Trib., Jan. 20, 1994, at 21.
The FDA's gradual inclusion of more nutritional information and more ingre-
dients on labels as health awareness has increased also supports the possibility
of informed choice in this area.
40 The FDA's broad interpretation of misleading in this area is inconsistent
with its reliance on warnings and informed choice in areas where there is a
tangible risk of harm.
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health and nutrition.41 This approach also is more in keeping with the spirit of
the First Amendment.42 For all of these reasons, this approach is more likely
than FDA's current practice to reach a favorable resolution to the policy ques-
tions posed at the beginning of this paper.
Of course, this proposal is not without disadvantages. First, the same com-
plications would arise as always in terms of what to do about small packages,
small manufacturers, and other special situations. Second, manufacturers might
claim that such a warning unduly restricts their promotional activities, since
consumers might well assume that a manufacturer making an unendorsed claim
is untrustworthy. Third, the requirement of such a warning might intensify the
pressure on FDA to loosen its standards of approval. Fourth, on the theory that
too much information can be overwhelming and counterproductive, the barrage
of claims accompanied by warnings may be too much for
41
In similar situations, FDA has argued that consumers might forego medical
treatment if they think that they are receiving all of the available information.
The diculty with this argument is that it does not support FDA's current
approach. A complete nutritional picture will always be impossible on a label;
thus, it is preferable to give consumers as much information as is feasible and
then tell them to seek additional advice before relying exclusively on the given
material. Some health and nutrition organizations have advocated that the
FDA require language on food labels to the eect that diet is only one factor in
a person's total health prole, in order to ensure that people will not conclude
that exercise, for example, is irrelevant. Such demands, of course, could go on
ad innitum.
42
The proposal decreases the free speech concerns by ghting speech with
speech rather than prohibiting it. The Supreme Court has in fact expressed a
preference for explanations over prohibitions.
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many consumers, who will simply tune out all of the messages.43 Neverthe-
less, the advantages to an approach that would
increase consumer information and choice outweigh these disadvantages. It
avoids undermining the public's condence in the FDA. It allows positive un-
certainty (e.g. the chance that a given health claim will eventually be proven
to the satisfaction of the FDA) to be on par with negative uncertainty (e.g. the
risk of harm as expressed in package inserts and other warnings). It is a more
economically ecient way to distribute the information-gathering burden.45 It
is more realistic than the
See Jacob Jacoby et al., Corrective Advertising and Armative Disclosure Statements: Their Potential for Confusing and Misleading the Consumer,
46 J. Mktg. 61, 70 (1982).
44
To date, FDA has authorized only two health claims: that folic acid can
diminish birth defects and that calcium can prevent osteoporosis. So far, claims
about the relationship between vitamin E and heart disease are not allowed.
FDA's scientic standard is signicant scientic agreement, a standard under
which many great breakthroughs will go unnoticed.
Suppose the only alternative for a consumer who wants to be informed about
promising medical information about nutrition, until the FDA is satised, is to
inform herself via the scientic journals. Inevitably, she will have to subscribe to
more than one journal. Invariably, she will have to read each journal with more
than one product in mind || in fact, with each potential element of her diet in
mind. It would be much more ecient for a company with only one product or
one line of products to canvass all of the literature and attempt to present the lat-
est scientic data in a way that laymen will understand. This manufacturer will
be punished if it makes fraudulent claims, and now more of FDA's resources will
be available to police such claims. As Cass Sunstein has argued, because infor-
mational approaches to regulation leave considerable room for freedom of choice,
they avoid the ineciencies of centralized dictation of outcomes. Cass R. Sun-
stein, Informing America: Risk. Disclosure, and the First Amendment, 20 Fla.
St. U. L. Rev. 653, 660 (1993); see also Stephen Chapman, Scruelching of Facts may be Hazardous to your Health,
Chicago Trib., July 11, 1993, at 3
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FDA's goal to prevent all health claims that could potentially be
misleading, and thus it frees up FDA's resources for the policing
46
of more harmful areas, while at the same time allowing FDA to continue to
make progress toward authorizing more health claims.
V. Conclusion
Although the 1990 Act represents an advance over the previous strict prohibition
on health claims for food, it nevertheless only allows such claims as specically
authorized by FDA under narrow circumstances. FDA's interpretation of the
statute has created needless confusion over the dierence between nutritional
guidance and health claims. In this area, it is important to remember that we
are talking about safe products and truthful claims as the starting point, since
FDA can always prohibit unsafe products and false or misleading claims. Yet
the FDA cannot prevent consumers from making mistakes any more than it can
prevent all risks in food or drugs. A mistake-free society is no more possible than
a risk|free society, but an informed society is within our reach and should be
our goal. Thus, although the governments objectives in this area are laudable,
its approach can and should be criticized.
(The best way to assure that information gets out quickly is to allow its
transmission by the people who stand to prot.).
46 The cost of the new FDA rules has been estimated at between $1.7 billion
over 20 years and $2 billion for the rst year alone. See Sunstein, supra note
45, at 665.
20